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Does ethnofederalism explain the success of Indian federalism? 
 
Ethnofederalism has been contested as a solution for diverse societies as seen recently in 
Nepal (where federalism has been accepted, but the design and number of units remains 
heavily contested) and Myanmar (where ethnic minority demands for increasing 
federalization have had to take a back seat to the demands for increasing democracy).  It 
remains a heavily contested subject in Sri Lanka. Concerns are expressed that 
ethnofederalism will increase pressures for secession and/or lead to increased violence, 
through increasing a sense of separateness of the people living within that territory, providing 
resources for political entrepreneurs to mobilize groups against the center and will lead to the 
persecution of minorities within the ethnofederal units. India is an example of a federation 
that appears to demonstrate that ethnofederalism decreases rather than increases conflict 
through its successful reorganization of states along linguistic lines. However, a group-level 
analysis reveals a more diverse picture.  India has simultaneously been both a success and a 
failure at conflict management.  
 
In terms of population, India is the world’s largest multinational federation.  It contains a 
large number of sizeable religious, linguistic, caste and tribal groups, plus many regional 
divisions.  It is not unique in its diversity.  However, it was one of the few decolonizing states 
that purposively incorporated that diversity into its constitution through territorial recognition 
and territorial redesign. Most other decolonizing states saw the politics of territorial 
recognition as divisive and as a threat to their territorial integrity (e.g. Pakistan and Ceylon).   
 
Through the process of linguistic reorganization, India became what is known in the political 
science literature as an ethnofederation, where at least one unit of the federation is associated 
purposively with an “ethnic” category.  Ethnofederalism has received a bad press; both in the 
policy world, from statesmen working on constitution formation in places such as Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Sudan, Nepal and Myanmar, and in academia. In 1972 Eric Nordlingerii went so 
far as to exclude it from his list of conflict regulation devices.  In the wake of the dissolution 
of the socialist federations, many authorsiii argued that ethnofederal institutions had 
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entrenched identity politics and provided the institutional resources for elites to oppose the 
center.  
 
Many authors have discussed the dangers (or otherwise) of ethnofederalism but few have 
analyzed India over time in detail.iv Those that have done so used qualitative arguments only.  
This article provides a rigorous assessment of the Indian experience since independence, 
deploying a group level quantitative analysis, using the Ethnic Power Relations dataset.v  In 
the literature on ethnofederal design, India is generally regarded as a success.vi Is this correct?  
This group level analysis, supplemented by qualitative assessments, reveals that while 
ethnofederal institutions have promoted stability in India, territorial redesign has increased 
conflict when groups are intermixed or autonomy has been downgraded. These findings are 
significant as the process of territorial redesign continues apace in India: the 29th state of the 
Indian Union, Telangana, was created in 2014. This has provided further encouragement for 
longstanding demands for the creation of states such as Gorkhaland (from West Bengal) and 
Vidarbha (from Maharashtra). These findings are also important as other regimes, many at an 
early stage of democratization, are currently experimenting with ethnofederal design e.g. 
Nepal. The lessons from the Indian experience should inform the constitutional 
reconstruction process in other divided societies considering federalization such as the 
Philippines and Myanmar. 
 
The “dangers” of ethnofederalism 
 
Scholars and practitioners have been wary of recommending the territorial recognition of 
territorially concentrated groups. The creation of governing institutions that coincide with the 
boundaries of a group, creating a “homeland” for a group within the borders of an existing 
state, is assumed to pose a threat to the unity of the wider state. Thus, in states with multiple 
territorially concentrated groups, many politicians have either rejected the federal 
arrangement, as happened in Afghanistan in 2004, or have sought to deliberately cross cut 
group boundaries with internal governing institutions in what Liam Anderson terms “anti-
ethnic” federalism.vii In the case of Iraq a mixed solution was adopted, with the Kurds 
subdivided between three governorates, with important areas such as Kirkuk left outside the 
control of the Kurdish Regional Government.  
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Despite these concerns, over half of the federations existing today intentionally associate “at 
least one constituent territorial governance unit [ …] with a specific ethnic category.”viii    
This is Henry Hale’s definition of an ethnofederation, which we adopt.  As this article will 
demonstrate, although the arguments made against the adoption of ethnofederal institutions 
appear persuasive, they rest on assumptions about the operation of these ethnofederations.  
There are 27 federations in the world today.ix 14 of these are ethnofederal by Hale’s 
definition, just over half.x  
 
Table One: Federations in 2016.xi 
 Name of state Ethnofederal  
1 Argentina  
2 Australia  
3 Austria  
4 Belgium Yes 
5 Bosnia-Herzegovina Yes 
6 Brazil  
7 Canada Yes 
8 Comoros  
9 Ethiopia Yes 
10 Germany  
11 India Yes 
12 Iraq (in transition) Yes 
13 Malaysia Yes 
14 Mexico  
15 Micronesia  
16 Nepal Yes 
17 Nigeria Yes 
18 Pakistan Yes 
19 Russia Yes 
20 St Kitts and Nevis  
21 South Africa Yes 
22 Spain Yes 
23 Sudan  
24 Switzerland Yes 
25 UAE  
26 USA  
27 Venezuela  
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Historically, as Table Two demonstrates, ethnofederations are more prone to failure than 
non-ethnofederal ones. 15 ethnofederations have failed compared to only eight non-ethnic 
federations. Failure is defined either by a move to a unitary state (often through the takeover 
of the state by a military ruler; such as Nigeria in 1983) or the breakup of a state e.g. 
Bangladesh’s secession from Pakistan in 1971. 
Table Two: Failed federations 
 
Although we are dealing with a small number of observations, the picture is even more 
striking when we note that several of the failures of the non-ethnic federations are of very 
short-term mergers, borne out of decolonization, e.g. the United Arab Republic (1958-1961) 
and the Arab Federation (1958). These data illustrate that the concerns of those who argue 
ethnofederal institutions are dangerous (usually from the point of view of maintaining 
territorial integrity) have a case to answer, and make India’s “success” all the more striking. 
As will be outlined below however, their arguments rest on particular assumptions about the 
nature of identity politics and do not take adequate account of the ways in which different 
institutional structures within the ethnofederal form can accommodate diversity while 
ameliorating separatist pressures. 
 
Ethnofederalism encourages a sense of separateness 
 
Those opposed to the creation of ethnofederal structures express concern that these structures 
will increase the desire for secession.  They argue that autonomous institutions will promote 
Ethnofederations Territorial separation  That became unitary 
 Mali Federation, 1960 Indonesia, 1950 
 Malaysia, 1965 Pakistan, 1958 
 Pakistan, 1971 Burma, 1962 
 USSR, 1991 Nigeria, 1966 
 Yugoslavia, 1991 Cameroon, 1972 
 Czechoslovakia, 1992 Pakistan, 1977 
 Senegambia, 1989 Nigeria, 1983 
 FRY, Serbia Montenegro, 2006 Papua New Guinea, 1995 
 Sudan, 2011  
 9 8 
Non-ethnic federations Territorial separation  That became unitary 
 Arab Federation (Iraq & Jordan), 1958 Ethiopia, 1962 
 United Arab Republic (Egypt & Syria), 1961 Libya, 1963 
 West Indies Federation, 1962 Uganda, 1967 
 Central African Federation, 1963 Congo, 1969 
 4 4 
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the identity of the dominant group around which the borders have been drawn e.g. through 
promoting a group’s language and culture. This was the reason that Nehru was concerned 
about acceding to demands for linguistically homogeneous units.  Authors making this 
argument argue that it is in the interests of local elites to increase this sense of separateness. 
They do so by choosing the language(s) in which the unit operates and educates its children 
and university students, changing the curriculum to promote “their” group’s heroes and 
version of history (thus influencing the next generation), as well as using the local media to 
depict ”their” version of contemporary events e.g. the Cauvery water dispute between Tamil 
Nadu and Karnataka in South India.   Such control can solidify the boundaries of the group.  
By encouraging this sense of separateness, increasing the distinction between “us” and 
“them” (whether the “them” is a neighboring unit or is the center) ethnofederal institutions 
also increase the “group’s cohesion and willingness to act.”xii As Philip Roeder argues; 
“(e)thnofederal . . . institutions tend to create or to keep alive conflicts in which the issue is 
not simply about rights of different ethnic communities within a common-state, but whether 
the communities even belong in a common-state at all.”xiii  
 
Ethnofederalism increases the resources with which to effect secession 
 
The second argument made by those concerned about ethnofederalism is that it provides 
territorially concentrated groups with increased institutional resources. These include a 
democratically elected legislature and chief minister, allowing them to lobby for more 
resources and/or reject central legislation.xiv So, in Svante Cornell’s words, “establishing 
political institutions increases the capacity of that group to act” and also formalizes rules for 
succession, helping ensure that a “national struggle” could withstand a change in 
leadership.”xv Thus, a Chief Minister of a state can legitimately claim a democratic mandate 
to oppose central policies, as Mamata Banerjee (Chief Minister of West Bengal) did in 
relation to the water sharing treaty in 2011. The creation of a homogeneous unit can also give 
an ethnically defined elite (assuming that people vote along ethnic lines) control of governing 
structures, including security institutions. 
As well as providing increased institutional resources, Dawn Brancati argues that regional 
parties are strengthened by territorial autonomy.xvi This increases the secessionist group’s 
mobilization capacity: “regional parties increase ethnic conflict and secessionism by 
reinforcing ethnic and regional identities, producing legislation that favors certain groups 
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over others, and mobilizing groups to engage in ethnic conflict and secessionism.”xvii  Thus, 
the Parti Québécois in Canada secured a mandate in 1994 to hold a secessionist referendum.  
Even those well disposed to ethnofederations (under certain conditions) note that it “seems 
clear that [they] make it easier for groups to secede should they want to do so.”xviii 
Relations between groups within ethnically defined units are likely to be poor.  
The third argument made against ethnofederalism as a means of managing relations between 
groups, is that relations between groups within ethnically defined units are likely to be poor. 
Concerns are raised that the creation of ethnic homelands will lead to minorities inevitably 
being victimized.  This can be for two reasons.  Either they are discriminated against by the 
adoption of “ethnic” languages/cultures that they do not share, as some Anglophones have 
argued in Quebec.  Or, they are marginalized by the discourse that has increased the 
perception of “us” versus “them.”  This marginalization can result in violence against a 
group, which may not be prevented (indeed, it may even be encouraged) by the homeland’s 
control over local law enforcement, as was seen in the Indian state of Gujarat in 2002.xix  This 
can be the case for local minorities who are a member of a nationally dominant group, or 
minorities who are “twice cursed” by being a minority in a federal unit and in the state as a 
whole. Relations between groups within ethnically “homogenous” units may also be strained 
by the existence of (often) significant minorities – whose numbers may well be increased 
through migration.  
Limitations of these arguments against ethnofederalism 
 
These three arguments are not without merit. However, they rest on the assumption that the 
institutional recognition of an identity through the creation of ethnic homelands will lead to 
an increase in the salience of that identity and that this increase will lead to secessionist 
pressures.   Such an assumption is misplaced. The particular form of the ethnofederal system 
is relevant in explaining its success or failure, including the importance of power sharing 
arrangements, whether formal or informal. Also relevant is the timing of the implementation 
of ethnofederal arrangements as well as the particular demographics of these units.xx   
 
It is impossible to deny that redesigning internal state boundaries to create institutional 
“homelands” for territorially concentrated groups grants these groups significant institutional 
resources. These resources are multiple.  First, the creation of a linguistically homogeneous 
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area creates an electoral territory within which political parties can win a mandate for their 
political program. The opponents of ethnofederalism have claimed that this political program 
is likely to oppose the center. However, this is not necessarily the case. As “[t]erritory can be 
seen as a primary guarantor of two fundamental human needs, identity and security,”xxi 
creating an ethnofederal unit is an important affirmation of the “worth” of a group’s identity.    
It also gives that group security, especially if the powers that are devolved to that unit 
concern control over education and culture. In Lars-Erik Cederman et al.’s words, “the 
territorial nature of such provisions contributes to satisfying the group’s concern about 
guaranteeing its physical security as well as the survival of its ethnonationalist identity.”xxii  
Therefore, “[i]f the security of the ethnic group (as they define it) is promoted within a multi-
ethnic state, the motivation to secede is diminished.”xxiii Identity conflicts are often the result 
of a security dilemma,xxiv and increasing security through creating an ethnofederal unit 
reduces the political salience of an identity.  This does not mean that the importance of the 
identity reduces, but it provides the conditions for different identities to co-exist as they are 
not in direct competition with each other. xxv This has been the case in India.  
 
Rather than leading to political balkanization and the breakup of the country, the 
reorganization solidified support for the Indian state and the Indian nation as attested by the 
strength of feelings across the country on the “Only National”, “More National” or “Equally 
National and Regional” scale.xxvi Although the importance of language did not diminish, the 
creation of linguistic states changed the focus of political parties.xxvii  The party system in 
many of the states traditionally seen as anti-center fractionalized. Tamils are the oft-cited 
example in support of this argument.xxviii  The trajectory of these regional parties has not been 
to oppose the Indian Union as authors such as Brancati would predict. After the creation of 
Tamil Nadu the DMK (opposed to upper caste northern Hindi domination), split into a 
plethora of Tamil regional parties, with a focus on capturing the state for its patronage.xxix As 
Adeney notes, “the multiplication of parties [in the states of India] has generally been 
indicative of federal stability because political parties have tended to not base their platforms 
on mobilizing against the center.”xxx  
 
Therefore there is no necessary relationship between increasing institutional resources and a 
desire for secession.  Not only is secession never the easy option,xxxi but a rallying cry for 
secession will only be successful if the group feels its identity and interests are not protected 
within the ethnonational unit. If we accept the instrumentalist position that identities are 
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situational and subject to mobilization by elitesxxxii then ethnofederal institutions create the 
conditions where it is not in elite interests to pursue secession. Elites need a motivation to 
pursue secessionism (and of course, the population needs to be motivated to respond to 
them).  This motivation is more likely to arise if they do not have the opportunities to have 
their interests protected: whether these interests are defined in terms of the patronage that 
state power allows them to capture or in terms of cultural promotion.  The Tamil Nadu 
example is a good example of both. When these opportunities are absent, conflict is likely to 
result. 
 
The experience of ethnofederalism in India  
 
Calls for the reorganization of units along ethnofederal criteria preceded the departure of the 
British.xxxiii In 1920 the Congress Party committed itself to the reorganization of the political 
map along linguistic lines and re-organized its internal party structure on this basis.xxxiv After 
the violence of partition however, Prime Minister Nehru expressed concerns that India would 
be Balkanized through such reorganization.xxxvxxxvi He was forced to concede the demand 
under pressure from within and outside Congress.xxxvii The initial reorganizations in the mid 
1950s and 1960s were therefore on the basis of language.  The reorganizations that followed 
in the Northeast of the country were more on the basis of tribal identity than language. 
However, they must also be understood as ethnofederal. Most recent reorganizations such as 
those in 2000 were a complex mixture of identity, caste, tribal and developmental 
politics.xxxviii  The creation of Telangana in 2014 was also a complex mix of the politics of 
dialect (rather than language) and historical developmental grievances.xxxix  
 
16 of the 29 units existing in India today were created along ethnofederal lines.xl   In addition 
to these 16, as Table Three makes clear, a linguistic group dominates the majority of India’s 
states.  Although the more recent reorganizations have been for more developmental and 
political reasons, using a country level analysis India must be understood as an 
ethnofederation.  
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Table Three: Reorganizations of Indian states after 1956 
 
State 
Date Border 
change 
ENLG ENRG Largest linguistic 
group 
Largest religious 
group 
Andhra Pradesh 
 
2014 Y 1.25 1.20 89% (Telugu) 91.1% 
1956 Y 1.28 1.27 88% (Telugu) 88.4%  
Arunachal Pradesh 
 
1987 N 10.3 3.38 19.9% (Nissi/Dafla) 37% 
Assam 
1972 Y 2.51 1.70 60% (Assamese) 72.5% 
1966 Y 2.51 1.77 60% (Assamese) 71%  
1956 N 1.82 1.74 71% (Assamese) 71.3% 
Bihar 
2000 Y 1.76 1.39 73.1% (Hindi) 69.2%  
1956 Y 2.10 1.36 64% (Hindi) 84.7% 
Chhattisgarh 2000 Y 1.44 1.11 82.7% (Hindi) 89.6% 
Goa 1987 Y 2.59 1.95 51.2% (Konkani) 65% 
Gujarat 1960 N 1.11 1.25 95% (Gujarati) 89% 
Haryana 1966 Y 1.24 1.25 89% (Hindi) 89.2% 
Himachel Pradesh 
 
1966 Y 1.31 1.08 87% (Hindi) 96.1% 
Jammu and Kashmir 
 
1956 N 1.85 1.83 66% (Kashmiri) 68.3% [M] 
Jharkhand 2000 Y 2.69 1.97 57.7% (Hindi) 68.6% 
Karnataka 1956 Y 1.93 1.30 70% (Kannada) 87.3% 
Kerala 1956 Y 1.09 2.24 96% (Malayalam) 60.8% 
Madhya Pradesh 
 
2000 Y 1.30 1.20 87.3% (Hindi) 91.1% 
1956 Y 1.23 1.13 90% (Hindi) 94% 
Maharashtra 1960 Y 1.48 1.45 82% (Marathi) 82.2% 
Manipur 1972 N 2.42 2.35 63% (Manipuri) 58.9% 
Meghalaya 
 
1972 Y 3.11 2.82 45% (Khasi) 47% [C] 
Mizoram 1972 Y 1.77 1.33 73% (Bengali) 86.1% [C] 
Nagaland 1966 Y 11.25 1.99 14% (Ao) 66.8% [C] 
Odisha 1956 N 1.14 1.05 94% (Oriya) 97.6% 
Punjab 1966 Y 1.49 1.98 79% (Punjabi) 60.2% [S] 
Rajasthan 1956 Y 1.30 1.23 87% (Hindi) 90% 
Sikkim 1975 N 2.29 1.77 64% (Gorkhali) 68.9% 
Tamil Nadu 1956 Y 1.40 1.23 84% (Tamil) 89.9%  
Telangana 2014 Y 1.62 1.32 77% (Telugu) 89% 
Tripura 1972 N 1.9 1.24 69% (Bengali) 89.6% 
Uttarkhand 2000 Y 1.28 1.36 88% (Hindi) 85% 
Uttar Pradesh 
 
2000 Y 1.19 1.46 91.3% (Hindi) 80.6% 
1956 N 1.27 1.35 88% (Hindi) 84.7% 
West Bengal 1956 Y 1.22 1.51 90% (Bengali) 78.8%  
 
Notes: 
Linguistic and religious data have been taken from the census that was held after the reorganization of the state 
in question.  The only exception to this are Assam, Meghalaya and Mizoram, the data for which were taken 
from the 1971 census, broken down into the new states.   
“Hindi” refers to the category of “Hindi/Hindustani” 
ENLG and ENRG refer to the “Effective” number of Linguistic and Religious Groups within a state rather than 
the absolute number of groups. This formula minimizes the importance of miniscule groups. xli  
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However, when assessing the success of ethnofederations, it makes more sense to adopt a 
group level approach rather than a countrywide one. A group level approach focuses on the 
relationships that different groups have with the central government. This is empirically more 
rigorous than an approach that assumes that all groups will be equally satisfied (or 
dissatisfied) with the institutional structures of the state, and also allows for that fact that “the 
state is not an ethnically neutral institution but is an active agent of political exclusion that 
generates these conflicts.”xlii The data in the Ethnic Power Relations datasetxliii codes the 
extent and nature of group access to central power, whether that group has experienced 
territorial autonomy, and whether that group has been in conflict with the center or another 
group.   
 
Although India is normally seen as a success in ethnofederal terms, it has only managed to 
maintain its territorial integrity through the use of extreme force in areas of its periphery, 
including Punjab, Kashmir and the Northeastern states. All of these, with the exception of 
Kashmir, were reorganized along “ethnic” lines.  Is the conflict in these areas related to the 
failure of ethnofederal institutions? In the rest of this article we address this question. We do 
so using the Ethnic Power Relations and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s Armed 
Conflict Dataset (ACD), building on the work of Cederman et al who test a number of 
hypotheses concerning the success (or otherwise) of ethnofederalism.xliv We confine our 
analysis to the South Asian data to assess the responsibility of ethnofederalism for territorial 
conflict in India.xlv We noted above that ethnofederalism can promote incentives to work 
within the existing state, and can encourage the development of dual loyalties. However, as 
Cederman et al. set out, such an outcome may also require power sharing at the center.xlvi  
This is because “[ethno]federations in ethnically divided societies can help to promote 
autonomy and security for different communities, but not if they institutionalize majoritarian 
forms of government, as they all too easily can do.”xlvii We do so through posing two 
hypotheses. 
 
H1. Violent conflict in India has occurred in states that are not ethnofederal. 
 
H2. Violent conflict in India has occurred with groups that have been excluded from power 
sharing at the center 
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H1. Violent conflict in India has occurred in states that are not ethnofederal. 
 
To assess H1 we utilize two variables. The first of these is the measure of homogeneity or 
heterogeneity in the states of India. These data are collated from the relevant Indian censuses.  
The second is the existence of territorial civil conflict, collected from the ACD Dataset, 
which has been mapped onto the EPR dataset.xlviii We include all those internal conflicts that 
are related to territory.xlix  We acknowledge the limitations of this database, which records as 
“conflicts” only those conflicts that have above 25 “battle-related” deaths in a given year.  
This database also does not take into account other forms of violence, such as missing 
persons.  Although this data has limitations, it does reveal the conflict zones within India and 
their approximate start of conflict. Violent conflicts have emerged in Punjab, Jammu and 
Kashmir and in several (although not all) of the states of the Northeast as Table Four 
demonstrates.   
 
As can be seen in Table Four, the majority of the states having experienced conflict are 
extremely heterogeneous. As Deiwiks has argued, “regions can be ethnofederal to varying 
degrees.”l The States Reorganization Commission of 1955 defined homogeneity as the 
presence of over 70 percent of one linguistic group. As Table Three demonstrates, 12 out of 
the 29 states have less than 70 percent homogeneity on either linguistic or religious lines.  
Two of the Northeastern states (Arunachal Pradesh and Meghalaya) lack a majority on either 
linguistic or religious lines and Nagaland lacks a linguistic majority. The Northeastern states 
are additionally factionalized along tribal lines. Brendan O’Leary has argued that a Staatsvolk 
is important for federal stability. He defines a Staatsvolk as in existence when “the politically 
effective number of cultural groups must be less than 2 on the index of the effective number 
of ethnic groups”li (ENLG and ENRG in Table Three).  Such a Staatsvolk is either 
“demographically [or] electorally dominant” and has “the ability simply to dominate the 
[unit] through its numbers, or instead to be generous – because it does not feel threatened.”lii 
Looking at these data we can see that Assam (from which Nagaland and Mizoram were 
carved out from in 1966 and 1972 respectively), has had consistently higher than 2 ENLG.  
This therefore makes it less likely that the Assamese would be magnanimous, and indeed, the 
concession of Nagaland and Mizoram was made by Delhi rather than Guwahati.  
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Table Four. Data on violent conflict taken from the ACD Database  
Dates of violent 
conflict 
Territory Scale Cumulative 
intensity 
ENLG ENRG Type of conflict 
1955-1959,  
1961-1968 
Nagaland Minor Yes 2.92 2.08 Secessionist 
1966-1968 Mizoram Minor No 2.51* 1.78 Secessionist 
1979-1988 Tripura Minor No 1.90 1.24 Sons of the soil 
1979-1992, 1997, 
1999-2004 
Tripura Minor No 1.90* 1.24* 
Sons of the soil 
1979-1988, 1995-
96, 1998-2000 
Manipur Minor No 2.42 2.35 Secessionist/Int
er-ethnic 
1981-1993 Punjab War in 1988, 
1990-92 
Yes, from 
1987 
1.34* 
1.98* Secessionist 
1983-1990, 1994-
2010 
Assam Minor Yes, from 
2008 
2.51 1.70 Inter-ethnic 
1984 -  Kashmir War in 2000, 
2002-05 
Yes, from 
1992 
2.72 1.90 Secessionist 
1989-1990 Bodoland Minor No 2.51 1.70 Inter-ethnic 
1992-1997, 2000 Nagaland Minor Yes 11.25 1.99 Inter-ethnic 
1993-1997 Kukiland (Manipur) Minor No 2.42 2.35 Inter-ethnic 
1993 ------, 1999-
2000 
Manipur Minor No 2.42 2.35 Inter-ethnic 
1994, 1996-1999, 
2001-2004 
Bodoland Minor No 2.51 1.70 Inter-ethnic 
2000-2008 Islamic State 
(Manipur) 
Minor No 2.34 2.88 Inter-ethnic 
2003-2009 Manipur Minor Yes, 2009 2.34 2.88 Inter-ethnic 
2009-2010 Bodoland Minor No 2.37 1.93 Inter-ethnic 
2010-2012, 2014 
-  
Garoland 
(Meghalaya) 
Minor No 2.77 1.90 Inter-ethnic 
2013- Bodoland Minor No 2.37 1.93 Inter-ethnic 
 
Notes:  
Data on conflict taken from the ACD Database. 
 
End date is given when a conflict year is followed by at least one year of conflict inactivity; it lists the date that 
violence stopped, although this may differ from peace agreements. The intensity variable is coded into two. 
“Minor” is defined as between 25-999 battle related deaths in one year. “War” is defined as at least 1,000 battle 
related deaths in one year. “Cumulative intensity” is defined as a conflict that has reached 1,000 battle related 
deaths since it started. 
 
Data for ENLG and ENRG taken from the census for the state in which the territory resided at the point the 
conflict started e.g. from Assam for Nagaland in 1951, unless * Data taken from 1981 census,  Data taken from 
51st Report of Linguistic Minorities 
 
Looking at the case of Nagaland (where conflict diminished but then continued), the ENLG 
was 11.25 in the new state – reinforcing the lack of de facto control over regional autonomy 
by one group. In contrast, the state of Mizoram, created as a Union Territory in 1972 with an 
ENLG of 1.77, has been much more stable.liii Tripura ostensibly looks like an exception to 
this rule. However, its inter-ethnic conflict is a “sons of the soil” one: its conflict primarily 
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caused by an influx of migrants from Bangladesh. Most of the migrants spoke Bengali, the 
majority language, and therefore the ENLG score cannot capture the dynamic of the 
Scheduled Tribes’ (STs) privileges being threatened.  
 
Turning to other conflict zones, Paul Brass argued that the reorganization of the Punjab was 
so “imperfect” that it “has never been completed.”liv The state was only reorganized after the 
demand was re-couched in linguistic rather than religious terms (and it is significant that it 
was conceded only after the death of its implacable opponent, Jawaharlal Nehru). Thus, in 
the 1971 census Sikhs comprised only 60.2 percent of the reorganized Punjab’s population.  
The influx of predominantly Hindu Hindi speaking migrants in the 1970s as a result of the 
Green Revolution created a perception of a threat to this demographic balance.lv Although the 
religious balance had not significantly changed between the 1971 and 1981 censuses and 
Punjabi speakers had increased from 79 percent to 85 percent of the state’s population, the 
influx of “agricultural laborers, who were, of course, generally both non-Punjabi and non-
Sikh” as well as “well-trained” Punjabis having to emigrate to get jobs, posited a “threat to 
the continuity of the Sikh cultural community … in Punjab.”lvi This demographic threat was 
compounded by the centralization of the Indira Gandhi government, as will be discussed in 
more detail below.  
 
Those units that retain high levels of diversity fail to achieve many of the benefits of 
ethnofederalism such as increasing the security of the group vis-à-vis the center and 
promoting the national self-determination of a group within a unified multinational state.  
This is a recommendation for the creation of as homogeneous units as possible.  This is borne 
out in Northeast India. As James Manor observed, “its heterogeneities tend to go so far that 
they also undermine the politics of bargaining and with it the prospect for political stability. 
Accommodations tend not to hold in lands crisscrossed by so many multifarious tensions.”lvii 
The continuing existence of sub-state diversity, despite “ethno-federal” reorganizations draws 
attention to the importance of investigating sub-state solutions for the territorial recognition 
of diversity where groups are not large enough to create states around, as has been adopted 
with partial success in Tripura, where the creation of an Autonomous District Council under 
the Sixth Schedule has gone some way to ameliorating the demand for a separate state for the 
indigenous tribes of Tripura.  The concession of the Bodoland Territorial Council has been 
less successful in Assam, because of the continuing high levels of diversity within its borders 
– including a majority of non-Bodos.lviii 
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H2. Violent conflict in India has occurred with groups that have been excluded from 
power sharing at the center 
 
To assess this hypothesis we utilize three variables. The first of these is the “group-level data 
on ethnic groups’ access to executive power” described by Cederman et al.lix This covers all 
“politically relevant ethnic groups” and/or those “directly discriminated against by the 
government.”  This variable in the Ethnic Power Relations dataset is split into three: 1. A 
group rules alone; 2. Shares power; or 3. Is excluded from executive power.  The second 
variable is also taken from Cederman et al; the existence of “territorial power sharing by 
ethnic groups.”  The third variable is the existence of armed conflict, collected from the 
ACD, as described when assessing H1.lx 
 
In 2015 Cederman et al. found that “the conflict-reducing impact of full inclusion through 
central power-sharing is especially strong, but regional autonomy also has a pacifying effect 
vis-à-vis exclusion.”lxi Their finding questions the arguments of authors such as Roeder who 
caution against the adoption of ethnofederal institutions. But does this conclusion also apply 
to India?  In the South Asian portion of the dataset we find confirmation for Cederman et 
al.’s H1, that included groups are less likely to rebel than those that are excluded (Model 1, 
Table 5, -2.032***). We are however, unable to confirm their H2, that territorial autonomy in 
the absence of central power sharing will lead to less conflict than those groups that are 
completely excluded (Model 1, Table 5, 0.311).  There is no statistically significant 
difference in the onset of conflict between groups that had territorial autonomy and those that 
did not. Territorial autonomy is neither correlated with the onset of conflict or its absence in 
South Asia compared to those groups that possessed neither territorial autonomy nor access 
to central power.  Territorial autonomy thus seems to neither increase nor decrease the 
potential for conflict in South Asia. 
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Table Five: Effect of Inclusion and Autonomy on Conflict Onset in South Asia 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    
inclusion -2.032*** -2.507***  
 (0.263) (0.439)  
inclautonomy   -1.766* 
   (1.002) 
autonomy 0.311 0.202 0.435 
 (0.563) (1.220) (1.438) 
postwar -1.144*** -1.449** -1.238 
 (0.243) (0.718) (0.902) 
inclusionxpostwar  1.950***  
  (0.717)  
inclautxpostwar   1.384 
   (1.115) 
autonomyxpostwar  0.366 0.138 
  (1.265) (1.453) 
groupsize -4.739 -3.743 -10.01** 
 (4.983) (4.589) (3.954) 
groupsize2 11.85 11.19 26.02*** 
 (7.737) (7.995) (6.954) 
excl_groups_count -0.0653 -0.0617 -0.0601 
 (0.134) (0.129) (0.122) 
federal 0.559 0.439 0.170 
 (0.375) (0.381) (0.460) 
log_gdp_lagged 0.384** 0.314*** 0.351*** 
 (0.154) (0.107) (0.0871) 
log_population_lagged 0.600** 0.687** 0.564* 
 (0.245) (0.271) (0.337) 
ongoing_conflict 0.284 0.265 0.374 
 (0.563) (0.514) (0.497) 
peaceyears -0.0335** -0.0261 -0.0220 
 (0.0146) (0.0195) (0.0174) 
Constant -17.33*** -18.55*** -16.30*** 
 (3.875) (4.542) (5.931) 
Wald test    
B(incl)=B(aut) 28.49*** 9.37***  
B(incl)+B(inclxpw=)0  1.240  
B(aut)+B(autxpw)=0  2.290  
B(incl)+B(inclxpw)=B(aut)+B(autxpw)  43.77***  
B(incl&aut)+B(incl&autxpw)=0   1.080 
B(incl&aut)+B(incl&autxpw)=B(aut)+B(autxpw)   320.8*** 
Observations 2,087 2,087 1,674 
 
Notes:  
Dependent variable: onset of conflict [binomial 0/1]. 
Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. 
Notes: Models estimated using logistic regression. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. 
Variables “inclusion with autonomy”, “downgraded from autonomy”, and the interaction variable “inclusion 
without autonomy x postwar” from Cederman et al.’s analysis omitted due to collinearity.  
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However, Model 3 in Table Five demonstrates that autonomy when combined with central 
power sharing significantly reduces the chances of an onset of conflict (-1.766*).  This 
confirms the qualitative assessments made of the Indian case; where the Congress’ national 
reach ensured that the overwhelming majority of linguistic groups (after the reorganization of 
states) were represented within the party and hence the government.  After the decline of the 
Congress, the rise of regionally based parties (whether or not they were defined by a regional 
agenda) and the need for coalitions including these parties to form governments at the center 
(at least until 2014) has maintained the regional diversity of Indian cabinets, especially with 
regard to maintaining the North-South balance.lxii In addition to the representation in 
governing institutions at the center, an important element of the Indian success has been the 
three language formula, providing India’s multiple linguistic minorities with the institutional 
recognition of their language, including the right to sit government exams in that language.lxiii  
 
Central power sharing is therefore important, although all groups do not seek it as control of 
the unit confers more opportunities to distribute patronage.lxiv  When a group had autonomy 
but did not have central power sharing, then the chance of future conflict could not be 
accurately predicted – meaning that it was neither more nor less likely (Model 3, Table 5, 
0.435).   These data indicate that territorial autonomy without central power sharing is 
ineffective at preventing conflict, although it does not provoke more conflict. Why might 
regional autonomy in the absence of power sharing be more dangerous in the South Asian 
environment than in the wider dataset?  There are a number of possible explanations, which 
we address below. 
 
Firstly, although groups may have been given territorial autonomy,lxv “secession and violence 
in the territory of many failed federations followed directly from attempts by certain groups 
to centralize these federations.”lxvi Cederman et al. therefore posit a relationship between the 
downgrading of autonomy and the onset of conflict. Downgrading from autonomy is 
described by Cederman et al. as a situation when groups experience centralization, defined as 
a decline in regional autonomy within the previous two years.lxvii We widen their definition to 
define the “downgrading” more widely – including groups experiencing centralization within 
the last five or ten years as shown in Models 5 and 6 in Table Six.  
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Table Six: Effect of downgrading of autonomy and conflict onset in South Asia. 
 
 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
VARIABLES Downgraded 2yrs Downgraded 5yrs Downgraded 10yrs 
    
inclautonomy -1.726 -1.443 -1.518 
 (1.130) (0.931) (0.984) 
autonomy 0.386 0.612 0.547 
 (1.486) (1.389) (1.417) 
postwar -1.337 -1.278* -1.425* 
 (0.862) (0.725) (0.806) 
inclautxpostwar 1.426 1.376 1.510 
 (1.156) (0.895) (0.997) 
autonomyxpostwar 0.208 0.207 0.332 
 (1.450) (1.277) (1.341) 
downgradedfromautonomy - 1.919*** 1.373*** 
  (0.434) (0.323) 
other_downgraded 2.333** 2.357** 2.367** 
 (1.076) (0.981) (1.003) 
groupsize -14.07** -14.09** -14.19** 
 (6.826) (6.791) (6.811) 
groupsize2 34.73*** 34.16*** 34.44*** 
 (13.05) (12.78) (12.87) 
excl_groups_count 0.0114 -0.160 -0.114 
 (0.132) (0.127) (0.124) 
federal -0.325 0.0215 -0.0652 
 (0.510) (0.488) (0.494) 
ln_gdp_lagged 0.327** 0.301*** 0.319*** 
 (0.133) (0.0874) (0.0915) 
log_population_lagged 0.694 0.678* 0.679* 
 (0.464) (0.347) (0.373) 
ongoing_conflict 0.352 0.299 0.298 
 (0.520) (0.502) (0.510) 
peaceyears -0.0201 -0.0211 -0.0211 
 (0.0184) (0.0131) (0.0139) 
   (0.323) 
Constant -18.69** -17.74*** -17.98*** 
 (7.941) (6.109) (6.588) 
    
Observations 1,663 1,674 1,674 
a) Robust standard errors in parentheses 
b) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Cederman et al. found confirmation that there was a relationship between the removal of 
autonomy and the onset of conflict.lxviii  Using the South Asia dataset shown in Table Six, in 
which we adapt Cederman et al.’s model, we find a statistically significant relationship 
between the loss of autonomy over the past five or ten years and an increase in the onset of 
conflict.lxix  This relationship is significant at the one percent significance level. 
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Qualitative assessments of the conflicts in Punjab, Jammu and Kashmir and most of the 
Northeastern states demonstrate why this is the case.lxx  Many (although not all) of these so-
called “peripheral” states of India have experienced a disproportionate amount of President’s 
Rule being applied to them.  As Adeney has analyzed, using data on the number of days a 
State/UT has spent under President’s Rule (when the central government has suspended the 
State legislature), out of the top five States, three are in the “peripheral” regions, with Punjab 
topping the list.lxxi Many (although not all) of the Northeastern states have similarly been the 
subject of extended periods of President’s Rule.lxxii  President’s Rule (Article 356) can be 
applied when “a situation has arisen in which the Government of the State cannot be carried 
out in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution.”  Although it is not unusual for 
federations to contain emergency provisions, India has been exceptional for the politicized 
use of the provision.lxxiii  
 
Although demands for further autonomy were made after the reorganization of the Punjab, 
the majority of these demands concerned “tradable” issues such as the redrawing of the 
state’s borders, the location of the state capital and access over river waters.  Secessionist 
violence only emerged when Indira Gandhi, after being re-elected at the center in 1980, 
imposed President’s Rule on the state, and called new elections.  Pursuing short-term political 
considerations, she patronized a Sikh preacher, Bhindranwale, to undermine her political 
opponents, the moderate Sikh political party.  The increase in violence and calls for the 
creation of Khalistan promoted the attack on the Golden Temple by the army in 1984, 
precipitating a well-analyzed road of events culminating in the assassination of Indira Gandhi 
and the revenge killings of 3000 Sikhs. As James Manor argues, “[t]he ghastly crisis that 
gripped … Punjab …. could plainly have been avoided. It would never have occurred if 
leaders in New Delhi had not insisted on meddling”.lxxiv Levels of violence only reduced in 
the 1990s after long periods of President’s Rule, failed negotiations, and extensive army and 
police operations in the state. Subsequently, as analyzed by Gurharpal Singh, the Akali Dal 
have become partners within the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) of the Hindu 
Nationalist BJP in the central government, increasing their stake in the system.lxxv  
 
Although the situation of Jammu and Kashmir cannot be equated with the other States of the 
Indian Union, as Paul Brass analyzed, the case of Kashmir demonstrates a remarkably similar 
trajectory.lxxvi Integrated into India on contested terms, its special status under Article 370 of 
the Indian constitution has gradually been whittled away to an extent that it is virtually 
	 20	
meaningless.  Disquiet with the Indian Union only boiled over into armed conflict in 1988, 
after the rigging of the 1987 state election.lxxvii  As Sumantra Bose analyzed, the commitment 
of Nehru to democracy in Kashmir was superseded by the need to maintain a stable state. 
“Kashmir’s democratic aspirations were thus callously sacrificed at the alter of the ‘nation’ to 
which Kashmiris were expected to be loyal.”lxxviii  What is significant is that Kashmir, subject 
to electoral manipulation during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, took until the late 1980s to 
develop into an insurgency.lxxix The rigging of the 1987 election confirmed for many the 
impossibility of effecting change within the “system” and (partially supported from Pakistan) 
a serious conflict erupted, resulting in the deaths of between 40-75K people since 1992.lxxx  
 
Although not a technical element of a downgrading of autonomy as measured by Cederman 
et al., the willingness of the center to intervene using high levels of force in the “peripheral’ 
States must also be considered.  The periphery of India has been treated differently from the 
mainstream in this regard, with the willingness of New Delhi to securitize responses in these 
areas through the use of mechanisms such as the Armed Forces Special Powers Act 
(AFSPA).lxxxi  Although this has been covered in depth elsewhere, a contemporary example 
illustrates the point.  The reaction of New Delhi to the Patidar/Patel protests in the summer of 
2015 saw increasingly violent protests in the state of Gujarat.lxxxii  Around 10 people lost their 
lives, many at the hands of police bullets.  Although the army was deployed in Gujarat, the 
situation is incomparable to the state’s response in Kashmir a year later, when people took to 
the streets to protest against the killing of a popular secessionist leader, Burhan Wani.   The 
Indian state responded with the use of pellet guns, which, within six months were estimated 
to have killed nearly 100 people and injured a further 6000 – almost 1000 of these suffering 
injuries to their eyes.lxxxiii Many were innocent bystanders; several of the victims have been 
under ten. 
 
The areas of India that have experienced violent conflict are all border regions, and 
overwhelmingly (although not exclusively) those with a non-Hindu majority.  One obvious 
counter argument to the point that the conflicts are the result of institutional design and 
patterns of governance within India, is the involvement of outside forces in the promotion of 
conflict.  It is widely accepted that Pakistan has played a role in the Kashmir conflict, and has 
had a hand in fomenting other movements against India.lxxxiv  Cross border support has also 
been forthcoming from tribes across the India-Myanmar border and allegations have been 
made about Chinese support for some of the groups in the Northeast fighting the Indian state. 
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This support from outside actors obviously has a role in explaining some of the logistical 
support and the resources provided to the groups. But the fact that there were many missed 
opportunities to accommodate the demands of the groups in the Punjab and Kashmir 
demonstrates that, rather than having been caused by ethnofederal concessions, violent 
conflict is “related to the fact that these states have been treated differently from the rest of 
the Union”lxxxv and their effective autonomy has been reduced rather than increased.   
 
Conclusion and lessons for other federations  
“It is simply wrong to claim, as Snyder and others do, that [ethno]federations are 
unworkable.”lxxxvi Federations differ in design and the argument in this article is that the 
success or otherwise of a particular federal system in terms of managing diversity depends on 
its design, regardless of whether it is an ethnofederation. The question as Grigoryan has 
posed it is “what makes ethnofederal bargains stable or unstable?”lxxxvii Through rigorous 
quantitative and qualitative analysis, this article has reached the following conclusions.  
 
This article has demonstrated that ethnofederalism has not caused conflict in India.  Where 
ethnofederalism has been conceded, the overall story is one of accommodation rather than an 
increase in secessionist pressures.  This is because it has promoted security and a belief that 
the interests of the group are valued and protected by the wider state.  Nowhere is this more 
evident in the fact that political parties promoting ethno-linguistic interests have mobilized 
not only in defense of their state but are also seeking central power, to capture it for their 
interests. The states of India that have continued to experience violent conflict after 
reorganization have been those in which sizeable pockets of diversity remain e.g. Nagaland 
and Assam, and it must be questioned whether they can even be termed to be “ethnofederal.” 
 
However, although many of these areas that have experienced conflict cannot be said to be 
ethnofederal units, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that autonomy combined with 
access to central power has significantly reduced the chances of an onset of conflict in those 
areas that are ethnofederal and were organized on linguistic lines. This point is worth 
reiterating because India has had an informal tradition of maintaining a north-south balance 
in governing institutions. This was during the Congress era but maintained during the era of 
coalition politics. The rise of the BJP may replicate the era of Congress dominance (it is too 
soon to say whether 2014 was an aberration) but the current basis of its support and the 
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northern domination of Modi’s cabinet, demonstrate the dangers.lxxxviii  Taken with the 
promotion of Hindi, not unique to Modi’s government, but given a renewed lease of life since 
his election, the stage may be set for north-south tensions.  As noted, the three-language 
formula was an important component of ethnofederal success in India, and a threat to its 
existence will be seen as an attempt to centralize.  
 
Another danger that policy makers need to be alert to in ethnofederal systems is that of inter-
ethnic conflict within ethnofederal units. Conflict between groups is not confined to federal 
states; some of the most violent conflict in the last 30 years has been between groups in 
unitary states e.g. Rwanda. There is therefore no necessary connection between persecution 
and the creation of ethnofederal units. It is however plausible to argue that ethnonational 
federal units with control over cultural and linguistic policy are more likely to repress 
minorities who do not share the ethnonational characteristic. Even though there may well be 
mechanisms by which the central government can secure minority rights in a federal system, 
it is easier for the center to intervene to protect minorities in a unitary system where the 
responsibility for law and order resides at the center. Even though federal systems provide for 
emergency intervention in the case of breakdown of law and order, such intervention depends 
on a) defining the situation as serious enough to warrant an intervention and b) the center 
being willing to intervene (as it notoriously was not during the Gujarat pogrom of 2002).lxxxix 
In addition, although constitutional provisions exist to protect both linguistic and religious 
minorities in India e.g. Article 350A-requiring states to “provide adequate facilities for 
instruction in the mother-tongue at the primary state of education to children belonging to 
linguistic minority groups”, evidence exists in India that this has been ineffective. The most 
recent report from the Commissioner for Linguistic Minorities in India notes that “gross 
negligence has been shown in implementation of the Scheme of Safeguards for the Linguistic 
Minorities. Often the linguistic minorities are (sic) felt marginalized in their own land.”xc 
Although the center may have the de jure power to intervene, in practice it may fail to do so.   
 
It is this argument with which policymakers should be most concerned.    It is not hard to see 
why. Increasing the rights of an “in” group does not necessarily have to lead to the 
persecution of an “out” group (or groups). However, the tendency to prioritize the rights of 
“sons of the soil” may well increase conflict between groups as the identification of 
state/provincial institutions with a particular group’s identity leads to the codification of that 
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identity. One of the states with high levels of conflict, Assam, failed to even respond to the 
Commissioner for Linguistic Minorities.xci Therefore, the design of internal borders requires 
careful management.  As Deiwiks’ demonstrates, when “homogeneous” units remain 
relatively heterogeneous, the dangers of conflict are high. This is both in terms of failing to 
increase the control of the unit by the dominant group within that territory (who, as we see 
with the Bodos in the area of the Bodoland Territorial Council may not even be in a majority) 
and also in the potential targeting of minority communities within that territory.xcii Although 
this is not an argument against ethnofederalism – indeed it is an argument for higher levels of 
homogeneity – we must be alert to the fact that high levels of homogeneity may be difficult 
to achieve, either because of population intermixing or subsequent migration into the area. 
For this reason, ethnofederal solutions may be problematic and sub-state autonomy solutions 
may well be more appropriate.  
 
In terms of South Asia federal reform, the demands for “ethnic” provinces, such as in the 
Seraiki and Hazara parts of Pakistan, in the Tamil areas of Sri Lanka and in the Madhesi 
regions of Nepal, should not be feared, they likely to increase rather than decrease affinity 
with the central state. However, this comes with a caveat: such autonomy should be part of a 
wider accommodation of groups within central power structures. It will not be sufficient to 
focus on majoritarian democratization of these states. The representative nature of this 
democratization will be vitally important for continuing the federalization process in 
Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Myanmar. In addition, policy makers should concentrate on 
making the units as homogeneous as possible, and resist the temptation to “dilute” the groups 
through intermixing. Such a policy is likely to increase conflict, both internally within that 
unit, as well as with the center. 
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